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INTRODUCTION

The first Parmenides of Elea introduced into philosophy that which is the foundation of all philosophy, i.e. the universal, the idea in its purest form, the very thing they call metaphysical essence, which is contained in his most serious opinion, that the notions of thinking and essence are not diverse but the same, since true reason expresses nothing but that which is *)¹ ; and the same as the necessity of this notion demanded, dialectically established, removing all becoming. In this dialogue of Plato, for the first time as well as in him, with the plan tending as it did to the summit of that primary and supreme identity, the true postulation of the art of philosophizing is brought out, the idea and dialectical art already placed at such a high level, that even becoming and Non-being *) are established and explained. Thus, as it were, a most splendid monument is erected in honor of Parmenides, which parts of the philosophical progress are handed down to him by Plato, who claimed both the foundation and the place of philosophy, with the most serious question about the One, instituted and carefully treated.

¹ [I have omitted the footnotes from this translation, as the majority are further quotations from Plato in Greek. To my knowledge, there is no machine-translation software that can deal with Attic Greek, and I cannot read it, so this did not seem worthwhile. I have left asterisks to indicate their location. There are some footnotes which might have interesting commentary on the contemporaneous Platonic scholarship, which I may translate at some point in the future.]

ON THE POWER AND THE PLACE OF PARMENIDES AMONG THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES.

Too much seems to be paid to the argument that Theaetetus was written later than Parmenides in time, as if the highest evidence were thereby made that he was more perfect, namely, that he was more skillful in composing dialogues and handling matters, with the progress of time: which argument, as is usually urged almost universally, as if it were the most certain law and norm ever ratified, so in Plato it seemed to be possible to apply it with greater right, since in him that very thing appears as the highest, which only passes from one to another by progress. I would certainly not deny its truth, if I applied it with judgment and under certain conditions: but I do not think that its truth is so great that, unless other reasons come along, you can form a judgment from it especially about the greater or lesser value of any work. I mention this because of Schleiermacher V. S., who, while he correctly established the place of Parmenides, nevertheless does not seem to have sufficiently considered his reasoning for the following dialogues and especially for the Theaetetus.

Therefore, for a double reason, before Theaetetus, I inform myself that Parmenides should be reviewed with the utmost certainty before all the dialogues before the Sophist, in terms of meaning, almost as follows: Putting the end to the first series of dialogues, it is the most outstanding of all those that Schleiermacher calls elementary; and if that which, although not clearly manifest, leaves the reader to explain, is clearly explained and more strictly proposed in the dialogues that

resolve dialectical questions, in the Sophist, Phaedo, and Philebus, this happens in all parts to the utmost extent in the Gorgias and Theaetetus. The discussions in Parmenides, not only explicit, prepare the force of the serious dialogues; these are finally equal to Parmenides, and bring to an end that which was not yet clearly explained to the reader in it.

On the other hand, this dialogue is to be considered the foundation of the construction of the whole of Platonic philosophy; and although the dialectical reason of the species proposed by him is also clearly explained in the Sophist, nevertheless in Parmenides the dialectical foundation is established in all parts, as in no other dialogue; and as dialectic is the foundation of all the rest for Plato, so is this dialogue.

Theaetetus, compared to Parmenides, is an exoteric, so to speak, reason. The choice and habits of the persons conspire to make this happen. Instead of Parmenides dialectically pursuing some hypothesis into all its parts, Socrates directs the dialogue, ironically, wittily, shrewdly, poetically; dialectically and philosophically indeed, but not so that dialectical reason, the gravity of the method, and the perfect explanation of all elements are the sum of the entire dialogue. Here, rather, a certain object is at issue, the question, what is science? It is demonstrated that none of the three definitions proposed for that subject is suitable for what is to be defined. Since the whole of Platonic philosophy is concerned with solving this question, it appears that what is presented by dialectical reason in this dialogue to

formulate this question is only proposed negatively, namely, with the removal of *αισθήσει και δόξα*. What is done positively is a splendid delineation of the philosopher, which, although it seems to be only an epistle, nevertheless governs the whole as if by a guide; so that the sum of this dialogue is a poetic description. Those reasons are indeed entirely proposed positively, although they seem to be proposed only negatively. Since it is demonstrated in this dialogue that knowledge is neither "*αίσθησις*", nor "*δόξαν ἀληθῆ*", nor "*μετ' ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγον προσγιγνόμενον*"; then he explains each of these degrees in turn and assigns a place to each; then he leads the disciple all the way to knowledge itself *). pag. 199 d — c. This is most clearly seen.

But what science is, this has already been truly demonstrated in Parmenides. The method of inquiry, there illustrated from all sides, has solved that question by deed.

What it is to know cannot be understood except by solving the question: How is it known? The way by which knowledge must be advanced is knowledge itself. What truly is the end to which it must be reached can only be made manifest in such a way that it *allows* the way to itself. Dialectical reason, according to Plato's teaching, is the true foundation in which science is born, and the same is demonstrated in Parmenides from all sides.

That this dialogue is of lesser value on that subject, since it is nothing but a collection of elements of dialectical knowledge, no one can claim greater importance from that in

other dialogues. For in the Theaetetus there is the same collection of elements, but that dialectical abundance of Parmenides is lacking.

But the fact that the rule, which underlies the whole, is not stated in detail does not prevent it from being less present and effective. And it is stated in truth, since it is the foundation of the whole dialogue. What in Theaetetus is proposed as a certain singular and supreme question, to which the dialogue progresses by overcoming forms of lesser importance, in Parmenides is made in sincere inquiry, in the form of the One. This example of philosophizing proposed in Parmenides is the norm, the whole, and the supreme of Plato. This is sufficiently stated in the first part of that dialogue. It is the method of philosophizing.

The other parts of the dialogue are attributed to Theaetetus, whose character is more in keeping with the young man's genius than that represented by Socrates in the Parmenides. This will be understood by anyone who considers what philosophy Socrates proposes in that dialogue to be learned; Theaetetus is, however, "freed from vain labor." Theaetetus is not yet endowed with knowledge; rather, he follows a character not yet trained in philosophical questions; he is still engaged in the school of mathematics. Socrates, however, represented in the Parmenides, is already trained in investigating questions, and is now striving to understand the nature of species.

The third part is played by the mathematician Theodorus, who quite early "ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπένευσε" p. 165, who, very often challenged to answer, always completely denies, and claims that all dialectical reasoning is alien to him. Some may think, along with Schleiermacher **), that Theodorus is therefore more often challenged to answer, "so that the reader may more attentively notice the few things that are treated of mathematical matters", and we have not denied this fact at all; for it must have been of the greatest importance to Plato that wherever he thinks of mathematical matters, he should be seen: but another reason seems to lie hidden in this challenge of Theodorus: namely, that he is represented as a friend and defender of Protagoras, and that it may be made clear that not only the young man, but not even the old man, knows anything. — That the same Theodorus is a mathematician, this indeed, besides that reason proper to the dialogue and most suitable to it, concurs well with his whole reason.

But the greatest importance for explaining my opinion about dialogue is provided by a passage in Theaet. p. 183. "Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἳ ἐν ἐστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν *), ἦττον αἰσχύνομαι , ἢ ἓνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου , αἰδοῖός τέ μοι ἅμα δεινός τε. συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτη· καί μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον- φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιῶμεν , τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε, πολὺ πλεον λειπώμεθα."

First, from this passage it can be understood that the Theaetetus dialogue was not written before Parmenides, but after him, not only because Socrates relates that he was once together with Parmenides: for perhaps someone might say that Plato, knowing that Socrates had once disputed with Parmenides, made this mention of the time, but that Parmenides did not write the dialogue before Theaetetus; but nevertheless Plato, when he describes that debate of Parmenides more accurately in the Theaetetus, and admires the sublimity of his genius and the gravity inherent in Parmenides, and conveys how difficult the things taught by Parmenides were to understand, this most clearly declares that this dialogue, most serious in dialectical art, was written at an earlier time.

Then, as can be gathered from this passage, the dialogue Theaetetus was written after Parmenides; thus it appears that this dialogue is of greater importance than it should be.

This is contained in these words: "φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιῶμεν , τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε , πολὺ πλεον λειπωμεθα." These words indicate that in Parmenides the dialectical reasoning is much more serious and fuller than in Theaetetus that of the young man "ώδῖνα και μαιεύσιν". There a certain dialectical system is expounded; here it is a question of examining and educating the young man's intellect, so that he is led from known things by the steps of "αἰσθήσεως, δόξης ἀληθοῦς, μετ' ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγου

προσγιγνομένου" up to the science itself, there described and examined in all its parts.

But just as Parmenides is a sort of foundation for the dialogues that follow, so too Protagoras, written at an earlier time, is to be compared to him, so much so that Parmenides can be called a dialectician as a rule of the things set forth in Protagoras. For I would not say, with Schleiermacher, that in Protagoras that which is omitted in Parmenides is explained, since Parmenides seems to me to contain not only physics, but equally physics and ethics: since a dialectical disquisition on the connection of species is therefore the foundation of logical understanding, from which all things most truly arise.

Proper inquiry, the mother of thinking in each person's mind, is explained in Parmenides as the best aid to arriving at the thing itself, indeed as the thing itself; so it also seems to be the most intimate and effective method of communication; and every correct division of species, as well as ethical matters and the discussion of virtue to be taught, just as every discipline concerning the ideas that participate in things, and therefore physical things, must necessarily be placed in the connection of species, which is science.

ON THE CONNECTION OF PARMENIDES AND THE END PROPOSED FOR IT.

Part One

What is the meaning of the first part or beginning and its relation to the other parts of the dialogue, seems clear, provided that the explanation proceeds from and holds to that which is the end of the whole dialogue. This is indeed a dialectical connection of notions.

And by Zeno's denial of dialectic, from which the dialogue begins, as if from a certain past thing and lest the opposition of falsehood be desired, as Schleiermacher says, and by Socrates's greater postulation of the true art of dialectic arising from it, and by the approval which this postulate receives from Parmenides, by all these things the end of the dialogue is both directly and indirectly signified and declared.

It is not the purpose of our dialogue to teach how things are known and their conjunction with notions, but knowledge itself. For it is clear that no one can proceed to the solution of that question unless this has been explained. In this necessity the inner conjunction of the disquisition and the beginning is placed; for this reason the relation of things and notions is treated of immediately, and the ambiguity of the definitions which present themselves, what is first of all to be explained, is taught, namely the connection of the notions themselves: which then the question itself accomplishes.

Having laid these foundations of dialectical exercise, he pursues the series of dialogues that follow, explaining more accurately the reason given at the beginning, until he reaches the bottom of the genuine identity, which Plato was permitted to perceive as to its nature, having obtained the prize of the art of dialectic. This same identity appears in Plato's physics and ethics, just as Parmenides contains the foundations of both; for contemplating the notions in themselves, he prepares the way for that higher and purer knowledge, and in this way for the identity of primitive knowledge and essence.

Parmenides begins by seizing upon the separation of species and things made by Socrates, the two things posited by Socrates, species and those which are partakers of them. Those two things are indeed correctly posited, the universal and the singular; but in order that the same primitive thing may be postulated only — for if this is not posited, an empty game of conjunctions and separations, such as that of Zeno, arises — Parmenides separates the likeness of itself from the likeness which we have, and he produces it in such a way that the greatest difficulty in conjoining the two is understood.

These stages are traversed. Having given the declaration of species, which is necessary because from species the other part of the things to be joined is established — that is indeed more obscure, as it is immediately apparent, since Socrates does not know what is to be taken for species, and no doubt can arise from things — by which indirect reasoning it is

declared that species are universal to all things; Parmenides turns to the modes of exception or participation.

By the same right that species and things are still alien to each other, the relation of the whole and the parts is brought to them, and by this their conjunction is made impossible. Socrates, in a certain natural sense, proposes a splendid comparison, which in reality removes the difficulty and preserves the conjunction. This opinion is attributed to him, because what he contends that τα είδη αυτα καθ αυτά is true and does not exclude the other in any way; but since he does not yet know how to declare or recognize the internal connection that was opposed to him, he can only refute it by image and comparison. Parmenides praises the image and opposes another, which is repeated from the relation of the whole and the parts, as Socrates had assumed from the true connection; therefore he does not truly refute it. Nevertheless, Socrates approves it, although doubtfully. But why does he approve it? Because he had only brought an image; The connection, namely, τοῦ ἑνός καὶ τῶν πολλῶν not yet demonstrated, cannot prevent the image of the day truly posited by Parmenides from being corrupted, and part of the divine day from being exchanged with part of the cheap veil.

Then Parmenides continues: „ οἶμαι σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἑκαστον εἶδος οἶεσθαι εἶναι ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξη εἶναι , μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι , ὅθεν ἐν τὸ μέγα ἠγεῖ εἶναι.”

This one thing that came out of many things comprehended into one, cannot degenerate from its origin and therefore always perseveres in relation. Constructed from many things, from things, is not truly that which, turning above all contraries, creates and embraces them and itself. It has no power to preserve itself as a species, and it collapses with the individual phenomena.

Pressed by these constraints, the established connection, since it has not yet been explained by dialectical art, has already begun to be removed:

"Ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ἢ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκη ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχᾷς"

Parmenides gravely opposes this, which should by no means be neglected: for Plato is most interested in the fact that species are understood to be present in things.

But at the same time, because the purpose of the dialogue is that Socrates be led to the society of things and species only by the way and art of dialectics, it is again removed, and this for a reason that is only valid as long as the natural connection has not yet been explained. Things are not yet equal in a way to support the species, because the highest bond has not yet appeared. So that which is opposite, a sophism may seem to some, since that "ταλλα νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι" which is true, is taken as an argument against the truth, i. e. the connection. But the truth has not yet been explained, and it is consistent with the truth, to which the young man is to be led, to make it testify against itself. To

whom the truth seems false, it is truly false. While the separation of things and species still continues, their connection, although most eagerly desired, must necessarily seem absurd to Socrates. That such a society was really something absurd to Plato is of no importance here.

Socrates continues, defining παραδείγματα and ὁμοιώματα as separate.

This is most excellently refuted by Parmenides, because Socrates does not yet understand how that participation is to be effected; similarity is certainly not a form of society: (p. 132 d.)

"εἰ οὖν τι ἔοικε τῷ εἶδει , οἷόν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι , καθ' ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη ; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὅμοιον μὴ εἶναι ὅμοιον ; Οὐκ ἔστι. Τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἄρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἐνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶδους μετέχειν ; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐ δ' ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾗ , οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν . Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε τι τῷ εἶδει ὅμοιον εἶναι , οὐδέ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλῳ . εἰ δὲ μή , παρὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος , καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνό τω ὅμοιον ᾗ , ἕτερον αὖ , καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἀεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον , ἐὰν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνηται"

That which is made similar must be similar to the species, therefore also the species to which it is made similar. But the similar is necessarily a participant of one and the same species, of which and that to which it is similar; but by which similar participants become similar, that will be the species

itself — here the *species* is postulated as a conjunctive, constituting a similarity; but it has already ceased to be and the made similar thing; — therefore nothing can be similar to a species, nor a species to another; for besides the species itself another species would emerge: but if that were similar to any one, another again, neither will this progress ever cease.

Which teach very well that similarity is a category of relation, and that it comprehends the individual species in a completely different way, and that the individual species comprehended by it are held to be completely different, than by the relation of similarity. Indeed, both the individual and the species are similar to the individual, but this is not the true relation of the individual to the species. From this passage it is clear that Plato, when he speaks of examples and images, did not at all include them in the category of similarity. It would be far from him to prefer such a principle to his philosophy.

The argument of this passage is so firm, the explanation of how species departs into the finite and progress arises into the infinite, in every way averse from truth, so excellent, that it stands for all philosophy and can never be refuted by any reason.

Then it continues like this: "ὁρᾶς οὖν, — ὅση ἡ ἀπορία, — εἰ ἔν

εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἀεί τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις; ὅση ἡ ἀπορία, ἐάν τις ὡς εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ διορίζηται";

for: "εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γινώσκεισθαι ὄντα τοιαῦτα οἷά φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἶδη , τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται."

Having said this of Parmenides: *how great is the difficulty*, the greatest separation is brought forward, prepared by the fact that things neither share in likeness nor in receiving species, as this had already been stated at the beginning, since the society of both is not yet understood but sought. From which separation the world is said to be divided into two unequal in value, the one perfect and true, the other imperfect and vile, not sharing in each other, neither gods having a part in men nor men in gods.

This will indeed be the consequence if anyone wishes to posit each thing as a single species, always separate, namely — but its connection with each individual has not yet been discerned.

However, returning to the matter, Parmenides adds: (p. 135 b.) "εἰ δὴ γέ τις μὴ ἐάσει εἶδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι , — μηδέ τι ὀριεῖται εἶδος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου , οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει , μὴ ἐὼν ιδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι , καὶ οὕτω τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ."

He then continues: „The work is to be given to dialectics. "ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασον μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας" since from your faculty of knowledge, which

you have yet revealed, you will not be able to show that the same species, always existing and self-existent, are always existing and self-existent, but the same, since they are not altogether distinct from each other and from things."

In order to arrive at this, the end was proposed at the beginning; which proposition is immediately most carefully defined. Socrates asks: "In what way shall I institute this exercise?" to which Parmenides: "In this way, which you heard from Zeno". But since Zeno's disquisitions could hardly satisfy Plato, he makes Parmenides approve of what Socrates said to Zeno: "thought should not rest on those things which are perceived by the eyes *), but should rise to those things which one would most understand by reason and think to be true." He indeed praises Zeno's reasoning in general, as a dialectician, but he also means that that reasoning is flawed and does not exhaust all the parts of a thing, since it pertains only to those things which are subject to the eyes; and even so, how imperfectly, Socrates has already criticized this at the beginning, which as a supplement to draw to our place, since here Parmenides, Zeno's teacher and familiar, speaks, and his fault, lest the mimic habit of dialogue be disturbed, he touches on it more gently.

Zeno's dialectic is valued by Plato as much as it deserves. And in its end and design it still goes beyond true knowledge, and therefore it is negative: from the fact that there cannot be a contrary, it strives to show that there is only One. Plato wants this dialogue to be the contrary of

which; for this reason Socrates blames Zeno's dialectic, and Parmenides, who demands that the species themselves be demonstrated, agrees. For to demonstrate this in the species themselves is nothing else than what Socrates initially means by those words:

Εὰν δέ τις πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη —εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαί — and to them: ἀλλ' εἰ ὃ ἔστιν ἓν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ (not placed in the underlying thing but itself, and for the same reason many) ἀποδείξει τις καὶ αὖ τὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἓν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι.

But the manner of denying, the reason by which he explained and rejected the contrary, how shrewd and ingenious he was, his sentences which have come down to us, show, and for this reason Plato makes Parmenides say: οὗτος ὄνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος. Because of this dialectical form, of which you can say he was the inventor, (and hence he was really called Palamedes the Eleatic), because of this form therefore he is here commended in the whole. This dialectical method of investigating all things is commended by Plato, but another for the end and therefore in reality another and that under a more sublime form.

Therefore, then Parmenides p. 136 H. St. teaches the reason, by which one should inquire, Socrates proposed that what one should inquire, "χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ

αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι . . . εἰ πολλά ἐστίν , τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔν καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸς τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ · καὶ αὖ εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί συμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ , περὶ ὅτου ἂν αἰεὶ ὑποθῆ ὡς ὄντος καὶ οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὀτιοῦν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος , δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων , ὅ τι ἂν προέλη , καὶ πρὸς ξύμπαντα ὡσαύτως · καὶ τᾶλλα αὖ πρὸς αὐτὰ τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅ τι ἂν προαιρῆ αἰεὶ , ἐάν τε ὡς ὄν ὑποθῆ ὁ ὑπετίθετο, ἐάν τε ὡς μὴ ὄν , εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές."

This reason for discursive inquiry is another important aspect of the first part, even more important than the other one that contains Socrates' postulation, since the reason for discursive inquiry is already fulfilled in a certain way. For in this reason all the elements of that problem are contained, which are to be so united that a form emerges that satisfies Socrates' postulation in every way.

We will see to what extent the dialogue accomplishes this.

Part Two

I.

A. As regards the first hypothesis: εἰ Ἐν ἐστίν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἔν — Plato's opinion is this: it cannot go into its own opposite at all. But by the force with which it is taken in the hypothesis, completely empty of all predicates, it is so not true that it does not exist at all.

One of the hypotheses of this is not that which, outside of which nothing else presents itself, since in which all variety and singularity, when comprehended, have vanished, and which has nothing opposed to itself — but that which, with all predicates and notions rejected, is known as an unthinkable Nothing.

There are three εἶδη which are completely stripped of all, empty of all species. First, τὰ πολλά. Thus it has neither parts nor is a whole, and by this reason it loses all the attributes of space. Second, τὸ ἕτερον; third, ταυτόν. From these it is clear that nothing at all is left to it but to be One; it excludes all notions of similarity and equality, and also all notions of time, and with these, all essence and existence.

But the One, for Plato, is above all opposition, "sublime and not subject to the conditions of time," has nothing to do with our hypothesis. His hypothesis, that the One suffers what it must, and becomes what it is, has nothing to do with it.

How much interest Plato has in explaining the nature of the species themselves, around which the discussion turns as it were, is sufficiently taught in this first series of dialogues, especially concerning ὁμοίῳ and ἀνομοίῳ, the πρεσβυτέρῳ and νεωτέρῳ, which he transmits: almost the entire second. All of which would seem to have been added rashly and without counsel, if the philosopher had only wanted to do so, as to whether there is or is not One.

This is not only true of certain individual notions, such as those we have set forth above, but of all and of the whole complex of the question. For with those hypothetical words, which most strictly comprehend the head of the argument: "ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἔν εἶναι τὸ ἔν, πλείῳ ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἔν" the series has reached its end. All these notions, of which the One is a partaker, he denies one by one, to the One he adds nothing, except that Nothing itself, which that hypothetical explanation already includes, and from this it is clear that every attribute and mode, which seems to be somehow imparted to it as a predicate, e.g. infinite, immovable, etc., is excluded, just as the hypothesis itself, because in reality there is nothing else in the hypothesis than that Nothing, which can neither be defined nor thought nor named.

What Socrates says in the beginning, "worthy of admiration": ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα (τὰ εἶδη) δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακράνεσθαι This is the one that Plato seeks, the connection of disciplines and arts, which for him

consists in the society of species and their communion with each other.

In the first series, the species of του ενός, τῶν πολλῶν, ταύτου, του ἕτερον are considered in their mutual diversity, and the beginnings of what Socrates had proposed above about separating species have been made. For, according to Plato's method, in order to arrive at the communion of species, no better way can be found than to carry out that act of separating, as far as it can be done, and to pursue to the end even the smallest details that can be made from it.

Regarding the dialectical path *) , which the first series follows, these things seem to be worth noting.

It is ignorant to establish the whole nature of the Platonic question, that the method of dialogue is sophistry. If anyone wishes to insist on this term, it will be necessary to grant that the hypotheses and all the positions which are connected with them have a true character and reason for appearing to be sophistry. But if sophistry is that which deliberately deviates from the truth: even those categories of the mind, imperfect and defective, which, immersing themselves in one part of a thing, are unable to comprehend its whole and true force, and yet attempt to arrogate to themselves the appearance and dignity of truth, will be called sophistry. Therefore, true reason, demanding these things to be accounted for, exercises nothing other than justice over them, and exacts the punishments due, measuring them according to their own measure: in sophism

itself sophism demonstrates that: nor will anyone, except one who is little trained, convince the mind that reason itself is sophistry, since it is only the cause and effector of them, to be seen under that appearance which they truly have.

Let the same be said of our question also. If One is one --- , i. e. nothing but One which cannot really be *) , then what nature does it now lie, presenting before itself the appearance of that which --- is not is not many. By which imperfect position of mind, which is taken stripped of all relation and time and space and essence and name, One goes into *Nothingness* ; which absolutely cannot be done, since *it is* as One ; *it is*, since it has a name.

In order for the One to be referred to the notions of space and time, the effect was that, when all predicates were rejected from it, it presented itself as *contrary* to them and therefore *finite*.

It remains ἡ φύσις ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ οὐσα. Since Plato derogates from the essence of the One, since time is completely alien to it, this is because it was taken as lacking all predicates. For there is absolutely no essence falling into the One, and eternity itself, if it were predicated of it, already involves more than the nature of the One itself, τοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ὄντος is not even mentioned. But when time is denied, its essence is taken away, which was posited as mere unity, with the notion of multitude removed, without truth.

But if anyone in this part of the dialogue thought he was detecting a judgment about the Eleatics, and thought about Parmenides: το γαρ πλέον ἐστί νόημα; he seems to have little considered, leaving aside all other things from the question, that Plato's purpose was to demonstrate how much work is involved in that way of thinking which, neglecting the truth of a thing, recklessly turns to one arbitrary part of it and fixes itself in it.

But who is it that no predicate is left to it, when yet what we have said above has entered their world, opposing itself to them? Which simulates *eternity*: craving this, it is pressed by a greater want than the finite itself. Whatever finite is in relation, something else, to which it has relation, it always possesses. But the One has gone out of relation *to something else*, from its own nature, and therefore what it alone had, it has lost, the One being, and becomes Nothing.

It is of no use to praise the artifice of this question. It is a perfect example of the legitimate progress of dialectics, by which sophisms are *destroyed*.

In the hypothesis itself, it should be noted that at the very beginning of the question, the elements were taken from outside.

One *and* many — both are treated as if already given and done; *how from one many are made*, which is the internal relation of the One to the many, which is not sought beyond the limits of the dialogue; this is a sublime dialectical

problem, which could not have been solved unless the path of the question was bent, not to say disturbed; if it had been occupied with solving it, it would hardly have been necessary to act differently than if other things of lesser importance had been called into question, neglected or simply abandoned, so that they would no longer be needed.

Thus the first series has nothing but dialectical exercise, so that the mind may be established for collecting dialectical elements.

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The transition from the first to the second series is this:

Although the One has been brought to such a point by the progress of the dialogue that it becomes a pure nothing, it was always said to be that: εἰ ἐν ἐστί. Thus, having now reached the end, it gathers together its extreme powers, as it were, in order to obtain this *essence* predicated of itself. Which as one ἐστί, is its nature, which it has lost so much that, when it was stripped of all notions and predicates, it could not retain that ἐστί either. Now, however, where it is in it, that it is clearly denied, and that it loses itself, so to speak: remembering that something had been predicated of itself before, and that it had been granted that it *was*, it seeks to explain this very thing, i.e. the difference which it has in itself, the One and the Essence. The higher cause of the explanation of which difference is that *Nothing* itself is a position and involves a difference; yet this cause is indeed hidden here, and will finally appear in the course of the

dialogue. Here only the hypothesis is retained, already removed and no longer having a place. For a certain external reason: the risk of having to go through the series *again* arises, the hypothesis being more *accurately* observed, which, only imperfectly treated before, caused the One to disappear into *Nothing*.

We see that connection of species, the law of which is proposed in the Sophist and the Phaedo, here as if in motion. The task of "separating and mixing" is carried out in every way. The hypothesis immediately proposes the One in such a way that it is a partaker of the essence; the discourse begins with two species at the beginning, and together with these two, which are to be joined, the category of του μετέχειν is present. Three species, τὸ ἓν, τὸ εἶναι, τὸ ἕτερον, are offered, as each of them is fixed against the others; and all as if fixed and mixed together in the very distinction, which reasons are again resumed in the Sophist, where their true nature is established.

What I have already said above: here all things are in transition. The cause, the effector and rule of these notions is shown in the movement itself, not stated under the form of a law. The nature of the transition of species from one to another is taught; and also, by what reason each in its part is only that which it is; for they disappear and pass away one into another --- but again they are also born from one another.

The foundations of the question are laid down in notions such as: "το εἶναι and το ετερον, which belong to each other through all things and through themselves: for thus it is pleasing to render the Platonic καὶ τό τε ὄν καὶ θάτερον διὰ πάντων καὶ δι' ἀλλήλων διαλέλυθότα Soph. 259 a.". From the union of these, to which One is added, here the species of multitude and number is explained, which Plato thus expresses: ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἢ οὐσία νενέμηται

then: οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὄν ἔν πολλὰ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι . p . 144. Bip.

The relations of τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν πολλῶν are added, of the whole and of the parts --- of motion and rest, of the same and of the other, and finally of everything that is connected with these.

As the species of ταύτου καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου in the first series were denied to be united, they caused it to appear in the strictest terms, which the hypothesis had posited less accurately, so likewise in this second series. There are species proper to this series and immanent, and in them the act of passing shows itself through all the varieties of which it is possible to obtain.

First of all, we must turn our attention to the place, p. 147. *) where the *Same* is generated from the *Other* itself. It cannot be said how important it is; which does not create the absence of all true knowledge, but the true, taken by its own force and explicit to those which it involves, reveals the

internal nature of species. Here too we refer to the Sophist, from which it is understood, and the species to which adhere τὸ ἕτερον καὶ ταυτόν, and τό ἕτερον καὶ τ[?]. against themselves, that they remain as one, one against the other, without any identity being taken into account, by which Plato seems to have already comprehended them. They remain as they are by their primitive nature; which they suffer, they suffer by μετοχή of other ideas, not from their own nature, by which only those monads are which they are.

And as for the reason by which species are distinguished by themselves, the place should be mentioned where smallness and greatness are explained. This is done in exactly the same way as later in the Phaedo, which pertains to distinguishing species. In our place, since it is necessary to create a notion of equality, the most important thing: "those things take the names of the monads as participants" *) is omitted, but it does not pertain to the matter at all; for the closest conclusion is one and greater and less. The purpose was to explain at the same time the nature of great and small; for the more strictly the thing objects are separated from great and small, the more clearly their force of relation to each other appears.

Where in that part of the dialogue, which Plato calls τὸ τρίτον, the question of the One is understood in such a way that there is One and many and the same again neither One nor many, it is clear that this "neither - nor" is also said with respect to the absolute series. That itself in the transition of

Versari [?] this means, that which flows, which does not persist under this or that condition.

Here, then, the dialogue reaches its peak, where communion with time, by which the One in μεταβολή increases, is grasped by itself, and is considered as the primary form of all transitions. This species is the rule and, as it were, the thread of the series traversed through the labyrinth.

If we keep those two precepts from the Phaedo, first p. 71. a Ἰκανῶς οὖν ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία προῆ καὶ (εἰσί) δύο γενεαί ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ τοῦ ἑτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον. Which our discussion in Parmenides receives the whole and further promotes — . (However, it should be noted (p. 103. b.) ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει then μὲν γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία λέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμία · νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνόοντων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα -).

Then another p. 102. e. οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων , ἔτι ὄν ὅπερ ἦν, ἅμα τούναντίον γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι · ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἀπόρροχα ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. In this second the same thing that is explained in our place p. 155: ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ἐν we see verified and comprehended. We understand this equally about the first, for whether it is said:

a thing, as ideas are in things, or: contraries in transition under the condition of time, the same holds. The notion of time is the transition of contraries and the fluctuation of things.

This is the meaning and nature of the second series. This, insofar as on the one hand One under the notion of time placed in the movement of transmutation is proposed and offered to the reader, seems to supplement the first only; but on the other hand: p. 156. χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ τι διόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήθ ' ἐστάναι — ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλειν ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν .

Thus, therefore, the second series is in a certain way exalted above itself. For the beginning and source of the species of time itself, which itself does not fall into time, is understood to be invisible nature itself, which is both the foundation and the summit of the whole.

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C. This is what the first series aspired to achieve, and what also underlies the second, that which Parmenides excellently calls τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ ἄν. One, in chance and change, in time, thought, form, explanation, exempt from all its opposite, as a divine seed not subject to life, which gives birth to all contrary things.

The notion of essence which is here inferred is clearly differing from that which was still dominant through dialogue. Everything which the One had previously either

been endowed with or lacking; according as it was said to be or not to be in time, was denied or attributed. This also applies to the most important predicates, to explanation, thought, knowledge, name. Since the essence of του εξαίφνης is not in time, none of those predicates can now be attributed to it any more, but in a more sublime sense, insofar as all things are comprehended by it.

One, however, has some position: For it is a category which has an explanation, can be thought and known. But it does not have that position by its nature, but only in species. For in this category of the εξαίφνης, the One is neither said to be One nor many; it is therefore One which is not One, hence called άτολου by Plato: which as it is itself έν άτόπω, where it is conjoined with the εξαίφνης category, so this itself is άτόπον to all the predicates which are attributed to it, therefore to the name itself, thought, explanation, knowledge. The foundation of this category is τὸ ἄτοπον.

This is contained in the fact that truth itself is still involved, that it is completely devoid of all predicates, so that all things fall into it, but it itself is exempt from all.

This transition is like a vital force, by which all contraries become what they are; for if there were no transition, neither opposition nor difference would arise; yet this transition itself does not go into any other thing, but rather flies above, to which all things remain alien, placed on the ground, and which is therefore alien to itself, ἄτοπον by its very nature.

This is the ultimate and highest response that can be made to Socrates' postulate; from this, as it were, the summit of the dialogue, everything else must be seen.

Here it can be seen that τὸ ἐξάιφνης can be positively stated, namely as that which is placed outside time, τὸ ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ὄν , as a transition, yet this position - for nothing can withdraw itself from the position - is the negation of all things *) and therefore also of that (position) which was posited. Taken in this sense in which here, pure as it is a transition, separated and dissolved from all predicates, it is *Void*; but that Void which is the "source of motion and knowledge", is that nature whose force and scope Plato did not explain and therefore does not appear to have truly known. It involves the true nature of dialogue, which is why we can say that it appears only in it as if an image outlined in dialectics, the truth itself not yet manifesting itself. From this point, as if from a source, the abundance of philosophy and science was to be elicited.

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About the dialectical progress of the second series, the following are to be noted. The progress again arises from the whole and the parts and runs through the same predicates as the progress of the first series.

Do not neglect a matter of the greatest importance; namely, to the One always two of these predicates, a finite predicate is always attributed with a contrary. In this way, no predicate is attributed to it as finite, but in such a way that it

is subsumed [sublato] in it by its contrary, which also itself belongs to it.

One is not only one of these two predicates, ex. c. similar etc. , but the same is the other, ex. c. dissimilar. Since it is both, it is no longer either. That the One may appear in both forms, by abstraction , a judgment regarding only one part of the thing, it is held both in the one and in the other; since it is no less one than the other , nothing more can be attributed to it except that it regards only one part, and the progress may be completed in the same way, even if it pleases sophistry.

It is consistent that the thing about which the question is asked, sc. One is by its nature opposite, likewise this progression from completely opposite propositions to conclude opposites.

Perhaps someone is troubled by the fact that such predicates as whole and parts, equal, similar and dissimilar; and perhaps more so because such predicates as less and greater age etc. are conjoined with the One. (In "greater and lesser age" Plato has the notion of time, and in "motion and rest" the notion of space.) Plato attributes predicates of this kind to the One with the cause that it is not possible to conceive and determine its nature in the most strict way; also because Unity is the form of all species.

Although there seem to be sophisms *) in this progress, yet this flaw is removed by a more careful examination in this way.

Since every predicate is attributed to the One by itself, not together with the other predicate with which it forms a pair, completely conjoined, but in such a way that it lacks reality; that predicate is not truly imparted to it according to its nature, which regards only one part and according to its narrow scope. Whatever pair does not pass through itself into itself, so as to form a unity proper to the reason of its two parts: but into the One, since into the species of any unity, as into its center and base, each part, the other being omitted, is dissolved by itself.

But nothing is derogated from the individual predicates. They are so compared that they are dissolved into unity. On the contrary, we will say that those which are discrete are still too stable.

They indeed come together from every part into One, yet this is not the main consideration, because in this respect they do not remain in the same firm opposition as before, but only in appearance; rather, each, neglecting conjunction, consists in its own part, which does not pass into unity by itself, but each is separate by itself.

Nor is the One derogated from too much. For all things have the predicate of difference, and therefore the predicate of the One. It could indeed be said; both the One and the

many are not yet sufficiently derogated from, and the other on the one hand is not sufficiently attributed, because they are not explained by themselves, are removed, are joined together *).

D. E. The fourth and fifth parts of the dialogue are equally concerned with the question of ἄλλοις and lead to the contraries in the same way as the first and second parts, the One, but in an inverted order.

The fourth series is the effect that all things fall into τα ἀλλά;

the fifth proves that it cannot even be predicated of a combination.

The reason for this inversion is that τα ἀλλά already has a difference in itself, as if it were a discrete thing, by its nature, and therefore also all things; which difference they can only be stripped of with a difficult task: which is otherwise in the One, since in whose nature the negation of all difference seems rather to be situated.

In the fifth series the notion τα ἀλλά is treated in the opposite way; it is robbed of its property and true nature, and if you look at the things that are made in this series, its importance to the whole reason is the same as that of the previous series, although the hypothesis itself appears much more subtle and harder.

Of particular note in this fourth and fifth series are the notions of τοῦ μετέχειν [participation] and πλήθους [multitude].

Come, let us now firmly adhere to the hypothesis around which these two parts also revolve: εἰ ἐν ἐστί. To understand that the one is by itself and from its own nature τὰ ἄλλα (or τὰ πολλά) and vice versa, this exceeds the limits of the dialogue; therefore εἰ ἓν ἐστί, τὰ ἄλλα remains τὰ ἄλλα, and the highest they can reach is that τοῦ

ἐνὸς μετέχει. Nor was the one itself brought to a higher level than that which participates in the others. The higher and more interior intellect is placed in the ἀτόπῳ transition, which the third series shows.

The structure of the entire dialogue, artfully constructed like a building, must necessarily agree with the very nature of the notions. For just as that which is called τὰ ἄλλα is by its nature concerned with discretion, so the arrangement of the whole demands that it be placed next to that part which explains the transition.

That which is proper and peculiar to the notion of τῶν ἄλλων is the notion of πλήθους. What is most important to Plato to be fixed is that it appears, τὰ ἀλλά του ενός esse τὸ πλῆθος, into which τὸ ἄπειρον falls. A very remarkable place is p. 158: τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑπερόν τι γίνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὴ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἢ δὲ αὐτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν.

We have considered it necessary to note that these two parts (D. and E.) are referred to each other, and in the same way, in opposition, so far as this is done in the notion of πλήθους. Τὰ ἄλλα are πλῆθος or πάντα, and not πάντα εἰ ἔν ἐστι *)

II.

The second part follows: εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἓν which is treated in the same way as the first. Το εἶναι remains the subject, to which the opposite of that which in the previous part had been predicated adheres, but not as truly contrary, but only as different from it. This το μὴ εἶναι, which it has to the subject by reason, is treated in the same twofold way as the predicate of the previous hypothesis, τὸ εἶναι.

In this part all the gaps in the question of the One are filled in, as it were: all that had remained obscure, less clearly explained, and not sufficiently brought to light, are here illuminated, solved, and explained. For the fact that negation also has affirmative force, the species of *knowledge*, and the notion of difference attached to it, all these are gathered together here into one and illuminate with their light everything that had been previously treated.

A. That here the beginning is taken from a relation and immediately the question arises from a double notion, the cause is the hypothesis itself εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἓν. For it is urged by one mouth. Having treated in the first part the essence of the One, now the question is asked of its non-essence. Which hypothesis is now in a condition, since, after the whole series of essences has run its course, it is attached as if to the contrary already posited and absolute. For just as the other half of the first part, τα ἀλλὰ, insofar as they were in relation both to themselves and to the first, was first treated by reason of relation: so with the non-essence of the

second part, insofar as it has a relation to the first part and is itself related by itself, it must be dealt with.

The primary notion of this first series, through which it runs, which as it were pivots, is the $\tau\omicron \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota \tau\omicron\upsilon \mu\eta \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ [the being of non-existence?], the position of negation; which notion has rightly been judged the foundation of all true philosophy. You predicate pure identity, stripped of all, to be nothing, and nothing itself, while it is denied, to be posited; these are the two most important things, around which all moments of knowledge turn.

Here, then, in Plato, there appears that most subtle knowledge, drawn from the innermost recesses of the philosophical mind, upon which the greatest philosopher of our age built his doctrine.

For, in view of the sublimity of the divine genius which is in Plato, he sees that this notion is not different from knowledge, and that neither of them differs from the notion of $\tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\iota\acute{\omicron}\tau\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma$ [alteration?]. These three make one species; these are the widely shining rewards of arduous labor, the foundations of all philosophy of all times.

To $\mu\eta \omicron\nu$, since insofar as it is posited and discrete, is a participant in the essence, it also receives the same variety in a certain way: by participating.

B. It is clear that absolutely nothing can be said about an abstract non-essence. We arrive here at the same point as the

first series of hypotheses; and thus the identity of both τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος [the one existent] and τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος [the one non-existent], although not explicitly and distinctly expressed, is achieved.

C. D. Since the τα ἀλλά are diverse in themselves, the variety is first asked. As a foundation, the species τοῦ ἑτέρου et τῶν ὄγκων are substratum to the question.

To the species of τοῦ ἑτέρου are attached τὰ ἄλλα, which notion is pressed so subtly and with such strict force as never before, because now there is no One, and besides το ἐν and τα ἀλλά there is nothing. For the notion of diversity is τα ἀλλά itself. And although there is no reason for the One, nevertheless there is τὰ ἄλλα – ἀλλήλων.

That which is of the greatest importance. But these are τὰ πολλά or τὸ πλῆθος, τὸ ἄπειρον. Therefore the same reason which τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλήλων, will be the same for τῶν πλήθων among themselves.

Which reason cannot be said to be not truly , but only φαίνεσθαι, as much as it is intervening to be perceived.

This is understood by the fact that το πλῆθος is known so ἄπειρον that it cannot find true existence, but is concerned with opinion and appearance; and this is signified by the fact that Plato had previously established that τα πολλά without One did not even exist. τὸ πλῆθος is τα πολλά in the form of quantity; it is the highest indifference, in which

all distinctions, with the One abolished, have been removed, and in which no relation or reason has any longer a place.

Since therefore τοῖς ἄλλοις, having lost the One, nothing is left, but to be (ἀλλά) ἀλλήλων; it necessarily follows that that ἀπειρον πλήθος of singularity (i. e. unity) which is not proper to it, claims for itself a species, and as if a ὄγκος assumes the nature of ἄλλων ἀλλήλων, and by that reason assumes all things both predicated and discriminated, it certainly *seems* to assume. For even ὄγκος, stripped of all quality i. e. essence, cannot but pass into multitude. It is possible indeed to *see* here also a distinction and a fixed term; which nevertheless itself again passes into an infinite multitude, which, having progressed to infinity, is repeated.

ὄγκος is τὸ πλῆθος , (which is the true notion of externality) circumscribed by ends, which are not true, but only simulate the nature of the terminus; a simulated and fabricated species of the One, which therefore τὸ πλῆθος as external and alien to itself dissolves to infinity. ὄγκος is not yet that quantity , which they say is specific, whose determination and change also contain a change of quality.

In this part, the τάλλα which, the non-existence of the One being posited, are completely deprived of every predicate, and therefore all the predicates and distinctions which agree with the subject (τοῖς ἄλλοις) by its nature do not truly agree with it, but only *seem* to agree. They agree, indeed, insofar as the primitive distinction of its nature is contained, and yet

not truly, since it is deprived of the One, which was not posited to be.

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D. With this simulated species *όγκων* neglected, and the non-essence of the One alone retained, *τα αλλά* likewise neither are nor seem to be. If the One is not at all posited to be, neither can any of its simulated species exist, nor can *τα αλλά*; therefore nothing.

Having lost the One, *τα αλλά* itself, already in the third series (C), has been removed, and its predicates have received only the fictitious essence of Unity; but where the non-essence of Unity is sharply urged, neither can that fictitious species obtain any more, and there is nothing, if the One is not.

* * *

In this way, the beginning and the end of the investigation about the One, proceeding from the opposite hypothesis, have the same effect: both proceeding from the notion of *ένός όντος*, with others not existing, the investigation demonstrated that there is nothing, and proceeding from the notion of *ένός μη όντος*, One not existing, the investigation demonstrated that there is nothing.

The conclusion, which by affirmative reason unites everything into a greater dialectical unity, is not proposed. It is contained in a way in the transition to the *τώ άτόπω*, which transition itself in the progress of the dialogue

presented itself as one of the series apart from the others. The end of the dialogue, according to the whole discussion, collects all that has been accomplished; each part is proposed separately, and the relation of all their oppositions is contained in the word And, in a certain external way.

Thus Socrates' postulation has been satisfied for each part; the elements of dialectical Unity have been perceived according to their opposition and relation; but it is not left absolute for all parts, since the transition of opposites is not explained in them and through them, does not reach that supreme unity, which, embracing itself and its opposite, creates and understands its unity and difference; but is placed in τῷ ἀτόπῳ τοῦ ἑξαίφνης, in that which is ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενί; which indeed you may regard as the cause and foundation of the explanation of dialectics, although it is not itself.

The question of the connection of species has been carried so far that it is resumed by the Sophist, who completely resolves it. Schleiermacher considers our dialogue to have no just end, and rather to be abrupt than closed, so that it seems doubtful whether the situation we have is the true end of the dialogue, and that he thinks that this was achieved on the first journey of Plato, from Megara to Cyrene, in which city this dialogue seems to have taken place. Indeed, I would not hesitate to pronounce that the last words of his dialogue contain a true and just conclusion. The discussion is completely exhausted and carried to the end, and is by no means closed with a "simple affirmation". Rather, everything

is gathered at the end, and since each part is completely absolute, and those that are accomplished have been demonstrated most certainly, the only thing that still remains is the affirmation: that the thing is so, that the dialogue is put to an end. For this is the reason for this discussion, and in this are to be placed the highest praises that we will attribute to it, that nothing can be said at the end, except "ἀληθέστατα." By which word "ἀληθέστατα" when Plato puts an end to the dialogue, I would not say that there is nothing in it, except a simple affirmation, and that Plato ended it "not according to the reason of the dialogue or in a way that is foolish and unworthy of itself" **). Even the previous part was already concluded by itself.

ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF NUMBER.

Pag. 143, 144.

"Ούκοῦν εἰ ἕτερον μὲν ἢ οὐσία , ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔν, οὔτε τῷ ἔν εἶναι τὸ ἔν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι ἢ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄλλο , ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων"

So that with these three distinctions, One, Essence, and Different, where you embrace the three, it can be said "both" is made the *nature of the Different*. Then it continues thus: For the word "both" two can be said; but of that which was two, both are One by itself. This, applied to each of those conjunctions, makes three; then by the repeated conjunction each number is made.

Thus Plato constructs number from the nature of τοῦ ἐτέρου. But that number cannot be born from the nature of the One abstracted, but only by the fact that the One has a difference.

Εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἔν , ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι; (p. 144) the same: it is valid, as if you were to say: if there are two, there is number. For One and Is are two among themselves, therefore: if There is One, there are two and therefore also number. But if there are two, they are only different from each other, otherwise they would be only One. Therefore there is a third difference, existing together with both, by which it is effected that both are only as if they were two. If the *One is*, all are.

It seems particularly noteworthy that from their very qualitative nature these distinctions are rendered indifferent to each other and as if external i. e. countable. For the same reason that these three distinctions are discrete from each other, which exist only through and in their own distinction, it is possible that *in* this distinction, *through* this distinction as if indifferent and alien to each other i. e. countable, they are placed next to each other.

It still remains to be demonstrated that this difference is only simulated and in no way any longer exists, because in the One of quantity all true distinction has been removed.

ON THE SPECIES OF THE ONE

As the progress of philosophy has been greatly increased by this species being made the principle and norm of truth, so we should attribute the greatest importance to the fact that Plato used it as an example to prove dialectical inquiry. For it itself, having chosen it, shows itself to be a great and ample philosopher.

For this is the notion of the individual, which at the same time involves multitude**), and is the culmination to which Essence***) reaches in its dialectical movement; (in which quality by repulsion and attraction passes into mere quantity); but at the same time also the form by which Xenophanes conceived pure essence, pure identity of thought.

The progress and transition of the "powers of the One" consists only in the fact that something else is placed within it, and therefore the One manifests itself as the identity of itself and of others. Thus the relation that it had to others no longer holds any value for it; the One has received others within itself, and in this way quality has passed into quantity.

By this dialectical reason of the species of the One, it is possible that in Parmenides the One is treated in different ways. But it is not easy for the modes of this species to be investigated or demonstrated in their true form in the Platonic discussion, since they are either separated or mixed at will; rather, they appear dispersed and convoluted by external reason, less clearly. As long as it has not been

demonstrated that the One is a multitude by itself, and that repulsion and attraction are different forms of the same species, so long must those modes lack a just place in the system of philosophy.

And we have proposed to note only this, that this species of the One, by reason of its negative relation to itself *), and its double capacity of both excluding and embracing, is the best chosen to represent philosophical inquiry.

For when the modes contained in this species are considered from all sides, by themselves alone, with all extraneous things neglected, it is impossible for its nature not to be made manifest, even if it appears to be opposed to and disturbed by the elements dispersed within it.

Regarding the gravity of this species *) Schleiermacher most truly warns: "It should not be neglected that Unity is at the same time the universal form of all species; and only in this dialectical sense should the opposition of Unity and all others, otherwise devoid of cause, be considered."

This very universal form of all species is the One, because, when it is referred to something else, not to something else, but to itself, it is that force of action which is contained in the nature of the individual. And if the dialectical reason of the species were neglected, the opposition of the One and the others would certainly be devoid of cause: for nothing else exists in the One as the One; all difference is removed in this simple negative way.

But from this very negative reason many are made, which in truth are not alien to the One, but are the One itself, and are proposed by dialectical reason only as others, so that the One itself may be exhibited from its multitude, and by attraction and repulsion it may become that which it is, namely Unity. Even the negation, existing only in species, namely the many, is received into the One, and the determination, because it is not a greater relation to others, has completely disappeared. In this way, quality being removed, mere quantity is made.

We have added some passages from Aristotle, which are particularly relevant here: metaph. II. p . 55 seqq. Πάντων δέ και θεωρησαι χαλεπώτατον συμβαίνει δέ , εἰ μὲν τις μὴ θήσεται εἶναί τινα οὐσίαν τὸ ἔν και τὸ ὄν , μηδὲ τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι τῶν καθόλου μηθέν . ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι καθόλου μάλιστα πάντων ἔτι δὲ μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐσίας , δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ὡς κεχωρισμένη τις φύσις τῶν ὄντων . ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμὸς μονάδες , ἡ δὲ μονὰς ὅπερ ἔν τί ἐστιν . εἰ δ' ἔστι τι αὐτὸ ἔν και ὄν , ἀναγκαῖον οὐσίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ ὄν και τὸ ἔν . οὐ γὰρ ἕτερόν τι καθόλου κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα αὐτά. Ἄλλὰ μὴν εἴ γ' ἔσται τι αὐτὸ ὄν και αὐτὸ ἔν, πολλή ἀπορία ὥστε κατὰ τὸν Παρμενίδου ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν λόγον ἔν ἅπαντα εἶναι τὰ ὄντα και τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὄν . κ. τ. λ.

ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL POWER OF PLATONIC DIALECTICS

The art which is visible in Platonic philosophy, that divine dialectical power, celebrated by various proclamations of all times, is indeed very different from that dialectic which is of our more recent philosophy. The explanation of the difference which contains, as it were, the life and true power of both, will demonstrate and will alone enable that which may seem obscure in both to be brought to clarity and placed in the light.

It seems that Plato's true reason and nature is that the inner life of ideas is reflected in the vigor and form of thinking, as if in a mirror, and that he is both a German philosopher and a philosophical artist. Accustomed to the familiar practice of Socrates and inflamed by him, who was the first among men to represent a living and breathing image of philosophy, having experienced the ineluctable force of conversation: he had seen that this was the only perfect and true reason for investigating truth, and the volubility and eager vigor of thoughts could in no way find in him a form suitable to itself, except when, the mother of thoughts in others as well, it itself was animated by truth and life.

In which two things are to be distinguished: the thing or end, to which one must arrive, and the instrument or way, by

which one must arrive at it. One is of knowledge, the other of investigation.

Whoever, therefore, knows Plato more accurately, to whom it seems that all earthly things cannot reach the possession of true and pure intelligence; whoever, moreover, does not suffer the philosopher to rest in wisdom, but places his life and wisdom in it, so that he may recover and regenerate both with ever new effort and exertion, by an unceasing study of the remembrance of divine things: he will certainly seem to agree very well with Plato, because in his first youthful work he judges so severely of the imperfect nature of writing, and in general he chastises the whole of it by letters as if it were needy and helpless; but most of all he condemns the perpetuity of speech, as by which all life is extinguished.

Wisdom is situated in the very act of discovering the truth, and that act is born from the dialectical definition of thoughts.

Which path, again, is to be considered in a twofold way: and to the extent that, progressing along it, we ourselves gradually ascend to the certain and ratified norm of law: and to the extent that, by its assistance to others, we can become the authors of procreating thoughts.

The art of the same dialogue is the same, both in arriving at the thing which is called into question by thought, and in

generating thoughts in others: between which there is no other point of difference than that the laws which in seeking it one has experienced in oneself are rediscovered in the society of others.

This is the primary thing that must be kept in mind in outlining Platonic dialectics, that his philosophy is truly an investigation.

Since, therefore, in the philosophical consideration of things, no step truly goes beyond the end, since rather each involves a prior knowledge of it; in this very close conjunction of argument and form, which in Plato, as it were, flows from his own method of philosophizing, the dialectical way of inquiry must necessarily coalesce into one with the knowledge found at the end of the way, and the same as that of the other, must be both the excellence and the defect of the other.

Both, indeed, the innate desire for living and vigorous thought and the study of generating thoughts in others, must be contemplated and known, because the nature and true notion of Platonic philosophy is ethical, and in him the ideas of beauty, truth, and knowledge are grasped by one and the highest notion of the good, as it were, by a bond. To this, as inferiors, they are subject.

Questions about the good and about knowledge are so closely linked to Plato that they can in no way be separated. The former is brought to its end, which is the republic, in

discussions about teaching virtue, the latter in discussions about ideas and their association with things.

Recalling what we have previously discussed about Plato's own and special inquiry: that the argument of Platonic philosophy is that the nature of knowledge in the universe, the mode and degree of virtue depending on the degree of knowledge, and that in this association of one with another and the dependence of one on another, that image of ethics, which is the highest aspect of it, is contained: it will easily appear that in questions about the nature of ideas the primary seat of Platonic dialectics and discipline is to be sought.

For although the Republic is rightly considered as the end and summit of Platonic wisdom, nevertheless, as its very existence proceeds from the Platonic contemplation of nature and of man subject to his conditions, all things are equally based on the knowledge of pure species and the supreme law that reigns in all, the divine life of ideas, the remembrance of that which truly is. This is the highest, as it were, ether, where the philosopher's mind is adorned with royal dignity and acquires the consciousness of immortality.

If anyone, therefore, persists in the idea that, while virtue is said to depend on knowledge, yet good is proposed as much more sublime than knowledge: this is indeed easy to reconcile, because virtue is not yet good itself. Both, virtue and knowledge, pave the way to good, are the striving to progress towards good, the effort of the human mind to

arrive there. Good, in contrast, is the perfect and supreme unity of both, God himself in the unity of essence.

Just as in the Phaedrus the impulse to philosophize is described and celebrated as a dialectical species of love generating ενθουσιασμό and fervor carried away by divine power, and the entire Platonic form of thinking is contained in it, as it were, the germs covered with a mythical envelope: so the definition, approaching more closely to its nature, is put forward under the rule of the species. 249 b.c. δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν τὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμόν ξυναιρούμενον. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ — τὸ ὄντως ὄν. — Πρὸς οἷσπερ (ἐκείνοις) ὁ Θεὸς ὢν θεῖός ἐστι. " p. 265 d . . . εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῆ διεσπαρμένα ὡσπερ τανῦν δὴ περὶ Ἔρωτος, ὃ ἐστὶν, ὀρισθέν τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν. p. 266. εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκότα ὀρᾶν."

This rule is illustrated by an example of the speeches previously held, and proven by the fixed laws of true rhetoric, p. 270, 271; all are included on p. 277.

It is explained more precisely that neither the species itself, nor the monads, the forms of things, those pure categories, are subject to a more precise question, by reason of their opposition and association.

Which is most evident in Parmenides, Sophist, Phaedo, Philebus.

That ideas are present in things, or, if one wishes to express this differently, that the divine and true appear in phenomena, so that they truly *exist and can be known*; that the universal is connected with the singular by a natural relationship - these things are established for Plato; as these are the elements of all philosophy, so they underlie the whole range of his thoughts as foundations.

It is of great interest to inquire: *in what way* this conjunction is effected. To solve this question, the places Soph. Phaedo. Phileb. do most of the work, treating it in a twofold way, both the conjunction of ideas with each other and with things.

Whatever form that is conceived, whether mythical of τοῦ δαιμονίου *), or under the notion of τῶν ὁποσῶν **), τῶν μεσός , τῆς μικτῆς οὐσίας , or the form of μετοχῆς , there always remains some third, in which the opposites are given to be reconciled into one; and that third either as an extrinsic approach or mixed from both, within both, as a new and having its own nature is a middle, which can be said to be neither the one nor the other by equal right. Thus Soph. p. 254 ff., which passage in the first serves to illustrate Parmenides. The species of *motion and rest* are opposed to each other in no way reconcilable; τὸ ὄν on the contrary as that which can be reconciled to both; and furthermore as being Different from both others, although yet being the *same* with itself, is placed. ταύτὸν εἰ τὸ ἕτερον itself is placed

as two species, different from the three, but necessarily mixing with them.

These five species are established as being entirely discrete; for when we say that motion is both the Same and Not-Same, we say this only insofar as we do not understand it in an equal way: now regarding its connection with the same, now regarding its association with the different.

We now have three species, τὸ ὄν, ταύτὸν, τὸ ἕτερον, which are both distinct from each other and in which they all participate [or, all things participate?], and which are no less distinct from all and from themselves. Κατὰ (p. 256 e.) πάντα τὰ γένη) γὰρ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος ἕκαστον οὐκ ὄν ποιεῖ, καὶ ζύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταύτᾳ οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν . 257. καὶ τὸ ὄν ἄρ' ἡμῖν, ὅσα πέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα , κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν — (for in what it does *not* have in itself, it is *One*) ὥστε τὸ ὄν ἀναμφισβητήτως αὖ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ καθ' ἕκαστον οὕτω καὶ ζύμπαντα πολλαχῆ *) μὲν ἔστι , πολλαχῆ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. 259 b.

Referring to the place cited above (254 b.) τὰ μὲν τῶν γενῶν κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλειν ἀλλήλοις , τὰ δὲ μὴ , καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπ' ὀλίγον , τὰ δ' ἐπὶ πολλά , τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ πάντων οὐδὲν κωλύειν τοῖς πᾶσι κεκοινωνηκέναι" — the relation of motion and rest, such that the opposition of such species is not removed, is neglected — if we consider the relation of those which are common to all, and the question of how the opposition is resolved in them; the answer will be: because it

is clearly removed from the middle, for which, as truly existing, there is clearly no place (in them).

This could only be achieved because everything remained the same as it was; they were distinguished by the nature of the Different, they were connected by the nature of the Essence. And that it is a partaker also of those things which are alien to its nature; truly and properly it is only that which it is, and remains unchanged; the Different itself, the form of variety, remains variety; but: διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν τὴν θατέρου φύσιν) αὐτῶν φήσομεν εἶναι διεληλυθυῖαν 255 e. Therefore also it appears that everything is connected to the Different itself in no other way than by the species of this and that thing. But what is common to all, what convenes all, is that connecting factor which is called identity.

The mutable nature of these forms is most clearly conceived in that the τὸ ὄν itself, as diverse, is opposed to the others as no less existent, and therefore itself as μη ον; and that Diversity, of negation and the species of τοῦ μὴ ὄντος *) it is said *to be*: ἡμεῖς δέ γε οὐ μόνον ὡς ἔστι τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἀπεδείξαμεν , τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὕσάν τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὄν ἕκαστον μόνιον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολμήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν." 258. e.

But τὸ ὄν and τὸ ἕτερον (the true force of which categories must be carefully observed **) for they express Unity and distinction, and comprehend all logical and thinking and

nature and scope and explanation [or, encircling and untying], which Plato quite clearly signifies) - since they pertain through all things and by themselves: τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὸν τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γε οὐ μετέσχεν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον. 259. Therefore, what is remains and what is added to it, does not add otherwise than by *participating*. Τὸ δὲ ἂν αὖ θατέρου μετειληφός, ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἂν εἶην γενῶν, ἕτερον δ' ἐκείνων ἀπάντων ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύμπαντα τὰ ἄλλα, πλὴν αὐτό.

It appears from this that each species is to be considered as a firm, immutable unity, nay, even those which are the purest, the most universal, and pervading all things, to whom all reality is subject, as it were, to supreme arbiters, and which in this power enter into various relations, of which one, by its very nature, is the foundation of all variety; and not even these should stray beyond the limits of Unity.

For Difference also remains in the unity of its primary nature; it preserves the firm notion of difference, and its essence is only a participation in the essence, not the essence itself.

By this participation, — this way of connecting, in which the connected truly remain what they were before they were connected: firm, immutable, monads — the reason is contained, by which Plato "species are mixed together." This is the solution to the supreme question posed by Socrates in the *Parmenides*. All that is there explained and signified to

this end through various labyrinthine interweavings of dialogue is shed in clear light in the passages cited in the Sophist.

Thus, in this category of participation, that which was there considered worthy of the greatest admiration, "to make the similar itself so that it may be unlike, or the unlike itself so that it may be like; the one itself so that it may appear to be many, and vice versa," is performed; thus contrary distinctions are appropriate to the species themselves.

Dialectices ars est . . . ὅταν τέ τις ἕτερον ὄν πη ταύτὸν εἶναι φῆ καὶ ὅταν ταύτὸν ὄν ἕτερον , ἐκείνη καὶ κατ ' ἐκείνο ὁ φησι τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον. Contra : Τὸ δὲ ταύτὸν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμηγέπη καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταύτὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν κ. τ. λ .; καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τάναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις , οὗ τέ τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενῆς ὦν · 259. d.

Nor can any other method of connecting be sought in Plato, if one considers the nature of his discipline, his philosophy, his head.

For since he most disagrees with Heraclitus's proposition about the flux of things as well as the origin of things, since ἡ μεταβολή has no other power with him than to signify transition, destruction, and that which, circumscribed by the narrowness of its limits, must obey the fallacious judgment

and relation of the senses, he could not admit that the idea of God in absolute unity, which is supreme to him, and the species of μονάδες which are to him in the closest relationship to nature, would truly leave unity, if he did not wish to be submerged in the infinite abyss of flux and transition. The faculty of mixing was to be indulged in them only to the extent that the truth of their very unity required it; and to the extent that this very variety was to be allowed to descend into variety and difference only to the extent that this very variety required it as the foundation of its own existence.

All these are given by the *category of participation* *) in which the disjointed elements of unity and variety are reconciled by an intermediary, as it were by an interpreter, a certain easy and convenient nature, in which the completely disjointed elements, without any conjunction between them, as if they "per se" belong; in which the disjointed elements are mixed, without any change in the conjoined elements in the mixing, so that they remain completely intact and unchanged; in which the whole Platonic machine of species is supported and sustained.

For just as the discussions on the dialectical nature of species in the Sophist also have the purpose of establishing and fixing the "τὸ μὴ ὄν"; so in the Phaedo they are used to demonstrate the immortality of the soul.

For there Plato thus (102. e.) οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὄν ὅπερ ἦν , ἅμα τούναντίον γίνεσθαι τε καὶ

εἶναι · ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι

103. b. (τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο) ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίνεσθαι · νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο , οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν , οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει · τότε μὲν γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμία · νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν *) , ὧν ἐνόητων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα.

p. 78. d. αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἢ αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον, ὃ ἐστὶ μονοειδὲς ἂν , αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχει , καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοιωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται. But: τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ they undergo a change: οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς, οὔτε ἀλλήλοις αὐτὸ δέποτε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν , οὐδαμῶς κατὰ καυτὰ ἐστὶν

This is further apparent from that place where he treats of the contemplation of nature from efficient causes, and of the νῶ [vow? voice?] of Anaxagoras. p . 100. b καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ, καὶ ἀγαθόν , καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα c. φαίνεται γὰρ μοι , εἴ τι ἐστὶν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, οὐδὲ δὲ ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι, ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ. Καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτω λέγω. d. τοῦτο δὲ ... ἔχω παρ' ἑμαυτῷ , ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν , ἢ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία , εἴτε κοινωνία , εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη · οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίνονται καλά.

p. 101. b. ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προστεθέντος, τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι, ἢ σχισθέντος, τὴν σχίσιν, οὐκ εὐλαβοῖτο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῶντος ὅτι οὐκ οἴσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον, ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου, οὗ ἂν μετάσχοι· καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν· καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος, ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἐν ἔσεσθαι.

This is the pivot of Platonic doctrine. Life and death pass into each other *) ; but not by themselves, not in the highest and purest form, which is the idea. For as far as these are concerned, they are completely disjointed from each other; Life, by this very force, is the soul **) , capable of no change; (in the same way as the highest and purest form of disease is fever; the odd Unity) death is destruction, dissolution ***).

What Plato said, that from a contrary thing arises a contrary thing -- this was valid concerning the substrata of change, insofar as the force of change exerts itself in it, Hence that which he says is that things *are participants* of contrary things. All things which thus participate thus far fall under the category of change. (Quite so are ideas.) Thus *in the body* the transition of life and death appears; it is alive, animated: -- life itself, the *soul* is not; for this, insofar as it is itself, is immortal. But the body is only a participant, and therefore also of the opposite: death.

In Philebus, in order to reach the end of his purpose, which is, having suppressed the pleasure and the explicit elements of essentiality, to obtain a place on which the true and perfect society of life rests as a foundation — that is, which is the medium between essence and transition, a participant in both, is introduced under the form of a perfect συγκράσεως —, some supreme being for human nature, in which the category of participating is exacted to the highest perfection as far as it can be made.

P. 15 b . Εἶτα πῶς αὖ ταύτας (μονάδας) μίαν ἐκάστην οὔσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν , καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε ὄλεθρον προσδεχομένην , ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιότητα μίαν ταύτην , μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ' , ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην , καὶ πολλὰ γεγονυῖαν θετέον , εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὐτῆς χωρὶς · ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνοιτ' ἂν , ταύτὸν καὶ ἐν ἅμα εἶναι καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι *). Ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα . . ἀπάσης ἀπορίας αἴτια, μὴ καλῶς ὁμο λογηθέντα , καὶ εὐπορίας ἂν αὖ καλῶς

Which correct distinction is τὰ ὀπόσα **): a determined multitude, P. 17 a . οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἐν μὲν, ὅπως ἂν τύχῳσι, καὶ πολλὰ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιούσι τοῦ δέοντος , μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν , ἄπειρα εὐθύς · τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει. Οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

In both ways of defining, and when we descend from the general through the special to the individual, and vice versa;

we must pay attention to the determined multitude placed in the middle: p. 16. d. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς αἰεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν χαίρειν ἔᾶν” .

But in both questions, both about the perfect συγκράσει of things and about the number placed in the middle, or about the distinction of species, of the one and the many, etc., the species undergo no change in themselves.

Outside that third, in which they come together for the formation of things or for the end of knowledge, each remains per se what it was, although of a very unequal value, since one is that which is endowed with the intellect, the formative; the other is matter, lacking form. One, which has ends and termination in itself — καὶ μὴν τόγε πέρας οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν , οὔτ’ ἐδυσκολαίνομεν , ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἐν φύσει p. 26 d . — It is and remains completely free from that which was determined by the συγκράσει, determined by its multitude; and outside its limits it preserves its own proper existence; and so also the fourth, the συγκράσεως effector, is clearly self-existent and not subject to the rest.

What we have already said is that the distinction between Being and Becoming is too strictly set; and although there is no Eleatic stability here (which is already apparent from the fact that the Parmenidean reason is reversed by the position of the non-being), although movement also appears as the principle of life *) and absolute beginning established in the highest unity itself, yet this movement itself is fixed in its own unity more strictly than that the system of all those

monads can be developed from the inherent nature of the vigor (the lower movement, the proper matter, from the opposite), than that species can be generated from its source both from itself and through itself.

This is what more recent philosophy has enjoined upon itself, and it seems to have done so, in our judgment at least. To inquire more deeply into this matter, as is the place, or rather, this task seemed to us to be postponed, fearing lest, beset by a want of discourse — not sufficiently capable of the new things which the progress of philosophy has introduced, — we should rather envelop in obscurity than illuminate this most weighty argument.

Plato indeed established the nature of difference in a way that was entirely consistent with more recent philosophy, and whatever terms he used for things, Hegel retained them in his logic. Thus we read in Parmenides p. 146 „εί τού τι ετερόν ἐστιν , οὐχ ἑτέρου ὄντος ἕτερον ἔσται; 164 ἕτερον δέ γέ πού φαμεν τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ἑτέρου , καὶ τὸ ἄλλοδὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλους ναί .”

But all these remain within themselves; firmly adhering to the abstract notion of change; nor, having emerged from the world of negative relation, are they comprehended and lifted into that unity by which they truly receive affirmative force, and acquire an essence that can truly and properly be called so.

Thus, for example, the variety of things that are subject to the senses, and the Infinite cannot be more truly and definitively understood than it was by Plato; and most truly, the whole of Becoming and Changing as sensible, finite, devoid of unity, and those things into which that Changing falls, are understood as being incompatible with the truth of the notion, not pertaining to it; but Becoming and its substratum are one thing, and *its notion is another*. Its true unity is that truth and immortality of essence, by which it is immortal. In it, too, the form of the mind contemplating and manifesting itself is discerned.

Thus, furthermore, the individual in Parmenides is conceived as existing for itself (p. 158: τό γε ἕκαστον εἶναι ἐν δῆ που σεμέναι, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ ὄν , εἴ περ ἕκαστον ἔσται .) *) which distinction, that very serious one, was received by Hegelian logic: however, with the added difference that here the notion is explained dialectically, whereas in Plato it appears in the abstract form of the monad, which clearly could not fail to be seen to be postulated here in its own place and as a property of the notion itself.

How much Plato intervened so that the opposition could be reconciled and resolved, how energetically he did it everywhere, so that he could subject everything to the idea of a single unity and elevate it to it, this, if we look at the dialectical part of his philosophy, is a very rich argument, because it is established that none of the ideas exist in perfect and absolute separation by themselves, that in order

to exist, all must participate in the essence, and that the essence itself is the same, etc.; which knowledge is the foundation of the dialectical parts of Parmenides in which it is so eminently proposed.

And the Platonic dialectic suffers only because this conjunction is established on the surface, so to speak, of the notions, and is not demonstrated from its internal nexus: because the intelligible substance has not yet acquired that faculty of self-development, which is the source of notions truly and necessarily elicited from itself, which is capable of composing a true dialectical system and ὄργανον, connected by the intimate nexus of its members.

CURRICULUM VITAE.

I was born in Berlin on December 13, 1806, to the father of Carol. Frid. Werder, a merchant. I attended the Joachimic Gymnasium, which flourished here for six years, and there I was imbued with those letters, which are usually taught at a young age. Among the teachers, whose entire memory I recall with a pious mind, I should mention the blessed Abeken and the most illustrious Zumptius, to whom I owe the most. In the year 1825 I was enrolled as a citizen of the Berlin University under the rector blessed Rudolph, intending to work in jurisprudence, to which I was drawn not so much with an internal love as with any other kind of study. However, as soon as I had removed the lessons of blessed Hegel, I gave myself entirely to his institution and attended all his lectures, to which I can never say enough how much I was helped. Yet it did not seem to me that I should be satisfied with philosophy alone; and I also attended the philological schools of the great Boeckhi, the historical schools of the illustrious de Raumeri, and the physical schools of the illustrious Ermann, to whom I here openly express my highest gratitude, and I demand the duty of piety.

THESES.

1. Those who demand that philosophy be understood by all, themselves do not know what they want.
2. The art of disputing, as being an art of genius, does not pertain to science.
3. That a historian should write without anger and enthusiasm, and not be occupied with the study of parties.
4. That the only German poet of the Romans was Tacitus.
5. That the Latin language is insufficient for philosophical arguments.
6. That the notion of freedom among ancient peoples is completely abhorred by ours.